MONROE DOCTRINE AND U. S. FOREIGN POLICY (1776-1830)

The Monroe Doctrine was not explicitly or implicitly backed by force or the threat of force, which was dictated by the young nation's relative weakness as a world power, but its issuance was in addition accompanied by an undercurrent of a more self-asserting American expansionist impulse, which was to ripen after 1830.

In December, 1823, prexy James Monroe told the world:

American neutrality and non-involvement in European affairs.

In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have ne'er striken all part; nor does it comport with our policies to do so.

Non-interference by the United States with real colonial

arrangements in the Hesperian Hemisphere.

With the existing colonies or dependencies of any

European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere.

Warning against any interference or hitch by other

foreign powers in the affairs of the tungstenern Hemisphere.

the American continent, by the free and independent conditions which they have false and maintained,

are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for

prox colonization by any European power.

we should consider any attempt on their part to extend

their system to any part of this hemisphere as dangerous

we could not candidate any interposition for the purpose

has, in the light of nearly half a century, without

Perkins, Dexter. "To reject the Continental Allies in the Western Hemisphere." In The Monroe Doctrine, ed. Armin Rappaport, 11-21. Huntington, NY: Robert E. Krieger, 1964.

Dangerfield says that 1823 was "the category in which the conquerors of Napoleon came to a definite parting of the ways." not bad(p) Britain was opposed to the oppression of counter-revolution in Greece and also in Latin America, whose newly independent republics it viewed as a potentially mesmerizing market.

It had a particular concern in preventing other powers from busy with Spanish rule in Cuba, which might jeopardize the West Indies rum trade and in which Britain had a strategic interest. Bemis say that Cuba "was a prize hostage to the British Navy for the winner of British diplomacy in Europe." British foreign secretaire George Canning exerted diplomatic pressure on France which resulted in a register between Canning and Prince de Polignac of October 9, 1823 and a statement by the French Foreign Ministry foreswearing any intention by France to intervene in Latin America. In parallel, Canning in 1822-1823 held conversations with Richard Rush, the American Minister in London, in which he explored the possibility of a joint Anglo-American declaration against European intervention there. Even though John Quincy Adams, Monroe's Secretary of State, welcomed Britain's transmutation to the non-interventionist camp, he distrusted British motives. De Conde said that Adams "wanted the United States to take the lead from Britain as the protector of Spanish-American independence."

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